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Offshore wind megaprojects in European waters have significant carbon abatement potential and increasing their number is a
policy goal for several European maritime nations. But experience has shown that governance of large-scale, commercial off-
shore wind development is not straightforward. It is found that in five EU member states, policy innovation intended to enable
investment in offshore wind projects is leading to a convergence upon a distinctive European model of offshore wind govern-
ance. The European Union appears to play numerous roles in this process and further research into how offshore wind policy
innovation propagates in the EU is warranted.
Policy relevance
The governance of offshore wind megaproject development places specific demands on several areas of policy. This article
firstly provides an account of recent developments in how offshore wind governance functions in some of the most important
offshore wind-using nations. Secondly, the discussion of the EU’s role in shaping offshore wind governance will inform future
debates about the proper role of the EU in enabling investment in these megaprojects. Thirdly, the fact that policy appears to be
converging raises questions about how policy is transmitted between EUmember states, the answers to which could be valuable
to policy makers looking at other areas of energy governance. Finally, the observed trend of increasing centralization of decision-
making should be of interest to policy makers mindful of the role of scale and decentralization in debates about energy
governance.
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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that renewable energy technologies have an important role to play in decarboniz-
ing the energy sector and tackling climate change (IPCC, 2014; IEA, 2015a; Mitchell et al., 2011). In
several European countries, the pursuit of offshore wind resources is a stated policy goal, not least
due to the apparently wide-open spaces of the sea and the avoidance of some of the problems of accep-
tance for onshore wind power generation (Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007; Twidell & Gaudiosi, 2009).
But, in the same way that Henry Ford’s customers could have a car in any colour (as long as it was
black), offshore wind projects only come in one size: extra-large; offshore wind turbines are the
largest rotating machines in history (Beurskens, 2011). A sector able to deliver the offshore wind mega-
projects1 that have become the norm in Europe (Anzinger & Kostka, 2015; EWEA, 2015) does not
happen by accident. Bringing an offshore wind sector into being has involved public policy choices
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in numerous areas including research and innovation, industrial policy, skills, and infrastructure such
as ports (BIS, 2013; Fitch-Roy, 2013; Wieczorek et al., 2013). This article focuses on the public policy
decisions that directly impact offshore wind project development.
Demonstrating compliance with relevant social and environmental requirements of regulation and
law, connecting the plant to the electricity transmission system and ensuring sufficient revenue to raise
finance are all vital parts of the project development process. In all European countries seeking exploit
their offshore wind resource, development and installation of offshore wind farms is carried out within
a framework of wide-ranging pre-existing and targeted legislation and regulations.
The governance2 of offshore wind project development is distinct from that of other, land-based
renewable energy technologies in two important ways. Firstly, the spatial planning implications of
the marine environment impact on the legal nature, allocation and complexity of the rights and
responsibilities of actors involved (Osherenko, 2007; Young, 2002). Secondly, nearly all elements of off-
shore wind construction are subject to greater risk and uncertainty that onshore renewables – in part
due to the status of scientific evidence of impact and partly due to the relative immaturity of the tech-
nology (Leary & Esteban, 2009) – but also the sheer scale of projects and the capital committed to pre-
paring a project for construction. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that the approach taken
to the governance of offshore wind development in five EU countries is converging or becoming more
similar over time (Kerr, 1983) and to reveal the nature and extent of the convergence.
Since the first commercial offshore wind farm was installed in Denmark in 1992, the policy and regu-
latory frameworks that govern offshore wind development have evolved in all European offshore wind
nations. Until recently, approaches among European member states were diverse with little or no com-
monality (Wieczorek et al., 2013).
Explanations for this diversity could explore, inter alia, the industrial history that shaped the existing
institutions, legislation and regulations (Toke, Breuskers, & Wolsink, 2008) or political economic
explanations such as varieties of capitalism (e. g. Hall & Soskice, 2001). This article surveys innovation
in the governance of offshore wind development in Europe to determine whether it is leading to con-
vergence between member states’ approaches over time and role of the European Union (EU) in that
convergence. Innovation is defined here as distinct from policy invention and therefore includes
approaches or ideas that are new to a particular member state even if they have been implemented
before elsewhere (Berry & Berry, 2007; Walker, 1969).
Energy policy making in the EU, perhaps especially renewable energy policy, is conducted simul-
taneously at the national and European level. Many of the properties of offshore wind, such as its
scale and potential role in connecting the transmission systems of nations sharing sea-borders,
mean that it is an intrinsically transnational policy area that demands coordination between national
approaches (Schillings et al., 2012). At a time when there is a concerted effort within the EU institutions
to create a European ‘Energy Union’ as a powerful integrative force with clear benefits for climate policy
(Buzek, 2015), understanding the ways in which energy policy innovations diffuse within the EU is
especially important.
In addition to an account of recent developments in offshore wind governance in some of the most
important offshore wind nations, this article analyses the nature and extent of convergence between
national approaches. It highlights and discusses some of the mechanisms that may drive convergence,
including (crucially) the role of EU policy, which in itself is no guarantee of national convergence
(Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2000). The article also comments on the nature of the governance
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model on which EU offshore wind nations are converging and its coherence with wider trends in
climate and energy policy.
2. Approach to analysis
The analysis considers two main areas of offshore wind governance, marine resource management and
economic governance. Developing an offshore wind farm has the potential to impact on society and
the environment (Bergstro¨m et al., 2014; Haggett, 2008; Portman, Duff, Ko¨ppel, Reisert, & Higgins,
2009). The legislation and regulations that manage these impacts tend to be complex (Leary &
Esteban, 2009; Salter, 2008; Wright, 2014) and the industrialization of the oceans has led to a rethink-
ing of marine governance (see Osherenko, 2007; Salcido, 2008; Wright, 2014). Central to this marine
governance is the management and regulation of marine resources such as marine renewable energy
including the allocation of seabed tenure and the processes by which development rights are issued.
In addition to marine resource management, there are two areas of economic governance essential
for the development of offshore wind farms. First is the question of how wind farms’ connections to the
onshore electricity transmission system are organized and paid for (Meeus, Le´veˆque, Azevedo, Saguan,
& Glachant, 2012; Meeus, 2014). Second is the nature of the financial settlement available to the
project owner.
Four elements of offshore wind governance are used as the basis of this comparison:
(1). The allocation of seabed tenure
(2). The granting of development rights
(3). The responsibility for connection of offshore power plants to onshore transmission
(4). The design of and approach to financial settlement
2.1. Seabed tenure
Models for allocating seabed tenure3 occupy a spectrum between two opposing extremes:
(1). An ‘open-door’ approach in which companies promoting an offshore wind project indicate a site4
where they propose to build an offshore wind farm for consideration by appropriate authorities
(2). A ‘defined-site’ allocation in which the government or one of its agents identifies a site that is then
allocated by the state to a company or companies exclusively for the construction of an offshore
wind farm
Between these two extremes is an approach in which state authorities offer an offshore wind ‘zone’
or zones for the construction of a single wind farm with a degree of freedom over the final location and
detailed design. Such rights are often but not always provided in conjunction with ‘development
rights’ described below.
2.2. Development rights
Obtaining permission to develop an offshore wind farm is generally more complex than for onshore
renewables (Toke, 2011). Much of this complexity arises from the number of public agencies from
588 Fitch-Roy
CLIMATE POLICY
which permits must be obtained or to which legal compliance must be demonstrated (Snyder & Kaiser,
2009). The other area of complexity is the requirement to undertake environmental studies and
consult with various statutory and other stakeholders as part of the conditions of many offshore
permits (Gray, Haggett, & Bell, 2005). Consequently, there are two main ways in which this targeted
reform may be implemented: (i) by limiting the number of public agents from which permits must
be obtained, and (ii) by limiting the public consultation or the data collection the developer must
undertake.
2.3. Grid connection
Meeus (2014) usefully identifies three distinct models for connecting offshore renewable energy pro-
jects to the grid (see also Green & Vasilakos, 2011):
(1). A ‘transmission system operator (TSO) model’ in which responsibility for extending the trans-
mission grid to accommodate offshore connections is performed by the TSO but responsibility
to connect to the offshore transmission system remains with the project owner
(2). A ‘generator model’ in which responsibility to connect to the onshore system lies with the wind
farm owner
(3). A ‘third party model’ in which a (regulated) third party is responsible for the connection between
the generator and the onshore system
In European offshore wind nations, electricity consumers ultimately pay for the connection of off-
shore wind to the transmission system and any required upgrades to the onshore system. Nevertheless,
the mechanism by which the costs are recouped is significant. The cost of building and operating a con-
nection to the onshore grid may be recouped through a TSO levy across all its users (generators and con-
sumers) or a direct charge on the connected wind farm. The onshore grid upgrades required may be
similarly charged to the developer or ‘socialized’ across all users.
2.4. Financial settlement
Policy makers have numerous design options available when considering how to support renewable
energy investment and there is a copious literature produced over the last two decades discussing
the merits of and problems with a wide range of models (see Del Rı´o & Gual, 2004; Fouquet & Johans-
son, 2008; Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006 etc.). From the perspective of a power generation
project developer, there are three elements to a financial settlement5. These are:
(1). Access – how is the settlement accessed?
(2). Remuneration model – on what basis is the plant owner remunerated?
(3). Deciding the level – how is the level of the remuneration determined?
Access to the settlement can be either automatic or constrained by budget or volume limits in some
way. A financial settlement must specify the basis on which payments will be calculated (Del Rı´o &
Gual, 2004; Fouquet & Johansson, 2008; Kitzing, Mitchell, & Morthorst, 2012). The classifications
used here are fixed payments per unit of production (e.g. fixed feed-in tariffs), sliding payments to
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meet a target price (e.g. a contract for difference) and wholesale+ : a payment in addition to the whole-
sale revenue, either from a fixed premium or the sale of a certificate6 (e.g. the UK Renewables Obli-
gation). The level of the remuneration can be set administratively, through a specialist market
ingreen certificates, for example, or by a process in which projects compete directly on the basis of
cost to determine the level (Table 1).
2.5. Member state cases
In order to explore the evolution of the governance of large-scale, commercial offshore wind develop-
ment, a comparative approach is taken. Five EU member state cases are chosen that account for more
than 95% of all operating capacity in the EU and in which some policy innovation to allow for future
offshore wind construction has taken place as part of a climate change mitigation strategy. The member
states chosen are the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. The table below shows the
selection of cases and their offshore wind deployment status (Table 2).
3. Offshore wind in five EU member states
3.1. UK
At the end of 2014, the UK had over 4 GW of operating offshore wind capacity, more than all other EU
member states combined (EWEA, 2015).
The British Crown owns nearly all of the UK’s territorial water seabed and a statutory corporation
known as The Crown Estate holds the portfolio in trust. Outside the 12 nautical mile (nm) limit of
the territorial waters, The Crown Estate (TCE) has the rights to license the use of the seabed in the
EEZ, which was designated as a ‘Renewable Energy Zone’ in an order of 20047. TCE corporation acts
as seabed ‘landlord’ and seabed tenure is provided to offshore wind ‘tenants’ on a commercial basis
(The Crown Estate, 2015b). Within areas deemed suitable by the UK’s Strategic Environmental Assess-
ment (SEA) (HM Government, 2013), TCE has run four offshore wind leasing ‘rounds’ to date (The
Crown Estate, 2014; Toke, 2011).
The early leasing rounds in 2000 and 2003 were bilateral arrangements between TCE and developers,
with developers effectively proposing sites that TCE considered (The Crown Estate, 2015a). In a change
of approach and informed by the UK’s ongoing Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), Round 3
saw zones offered in 2009 to developers by TCE which are ‘designed to be large enough to give devel-
opers flexibility in the location of wind farms within them’ (The Crown Estate, 2013).
Table 1 Options for an offshore wind financial settlement
Access Remuneration model Deciding the level
Automatic Fixed Administratively set
Constrained Sliding Specialist market
Wholesale+ Competitive process
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There are two principal permits required to build marine renewable electricity generating stations in
the UK: permission under Section 36 of the Electricity Act (1989) as amended by the 2004 Energy Act8
and a Marine License issued by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) in England and Wales
and Marine Scotland in Scotland. But, with the inclusion of large offshore wind projects (more than
100 MW capacity) as ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects’ in the Planning Act (2008),9 appli-
cation has been streamlined into the granting of a single development consent order (DCO) issued by
the Energy Secretary. Nevertheless, project developers are still required to conduct several consultation
exercises to obtain a DCO (HM Government, 2015).
Although early UK offshore wind farm grid connections were built, owned and operated by the wind
farm owner, starting in 200910 the UK model for connecting offshore wind farms has been known as the
offshore transmission owner (OFTO) regime (Green & Vasilakos, 2011; Meeus, 2014). The OFTO regime
sees the rights to ownership of each connection awarded to independent transmission owners through
competitive tenders. The early tenders required that the generator offer the connection to auction on
completion but the so-called ‘enduring regime’ allows for both ‘generator build’ and an ‘OFTO build’
model. The OFTO recoups its capital by charging the wind farm for access (Ofgem, 2014).
The decision to adopt a third-party model for offshore transmission was taken by the UK Govern-
ment in 2007 on the grounds that it would enable a more cost-efficient offshore transmission
system than an alternative, TSO-led model (DTI, 2007) with plans for the current competitive OFTO
system overseen by the market regulator coming later (Ofgem, 2007).
In common with all other large-scale renewable generation technologies, offshore wind in the UK
has been supported through a financial mechanism known as the Renewables Obligation (RO). The
RO is a variant of the tradable green certificate concept that has undergone significant changes since
implementation in 2002, but the basic premise that generators have access to revenues in addition
to those from electricity sales remains unchanged (Woodman & Mitchell, 2011). Access to the RO is
gained by accreditation of a project by the market regulator and all projects that meet the technical
requirement of accreditation have access to the system (Ofgem, 2015).
The main financial support system for large-scale renewables in the UK is in transition from the RO
to a new mechanism known as Contracts for Difference (CfD) introduced under the UK Government’s
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) programme. A CfD is a contract with a Government-owned counter-
party that guarantees the holder (generator) payments calculated as the difference between the agreed
support level and an index of the wholesale market price for a fixed period, 15 years in the case of off-
shore wind.
Table 2 Offshore wind deployment status in five EU Member States at the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015)
Member State Wind farms Turbines MW
UK 24 1301 4494
Germany 16 258 1045
Netherlands 5 124 247
Denmark 12 513 1271
Belgium 5 182 712
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Although the intention was to allocate CfD contracts competitively, the first offshore wind CfDs
were awarded in 2014 to five projects with the strike price set administratively to maintain momentum
in the pipeline of projects in the period of transition from the RO (DECC, 2014). The transition to com-
petitive allocation of CfDs was completed in February 2015 with two offshore wind projects winning
contracts to start operation between 2017 and 2019 in multi-technology auctions administered by the
TSO of Great Britain, National Grid Plc (DECC, 2015).
3.2. Germany
Following a relatively slow start to offshore wind development, Germany had more than 1 GW of
installed capacity at the end of 2014 with the rate of installation increasing significantly in 2014
and 2015 (EWEA, 2015).
While all issues of land tenure (and permitting) in the territorial waters of Germany are the respon-
sibility of the state governments (La¨nder), offshore wind activity in the EEZ is overseen by the federal
authorities. Prompted in part by the need to manage the social and environmental impact of various
uses of the sea (offshore wind in particular), in 2005, Germany’s Federal Maritime and Hydrographic
Agency (BSH) began work on a Marine Spatial Plan (MSP) for the EEZ. Coming into effect in 2009,
the MSP clearly identifies priority areas for offshore wind development (Bundesministerium fu¨r
Verkehr, 2009, p.19).
Nevertheless, offshore wind developers are entitled, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance, 1997
(Seeanlagenverordnung, SeeAnIV11) (Article 5), to submit plans for wind farms in other areas of the
EEZ. The BSH takes sole responsibility, under the Marine Facilities Ordinance and in consultation
with other competent authorities, for the permitting of offshore wind projects.
Although grid connection was originally the responsibility of the developer, an act was passed in
2006 compelling the relevant TSOs to provide grid connections (Markard & Petersen, 2009). Connec-
tion to the transmission grid is provided by the relevant TSO12, which is obliged under the Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz (EEG) or renewable energy law to provide connections at a rate of up to 800 MW per
year up to 6.5 GW in 2020 (Lang, 2014).
Germany has had a feed-in system for a range of renewables in place since 1991, originally structured
as a supplement to the wholesale power price and replaced by EEG in 2000, which guaranteed a fixed
price per unit of production for a fixed period of time (Mitchell et al., 2006) and extended the
support to include offshore wind. In 201213 the EEG law made provision for ‘direct marketing’ of elec-
tricity from renewable sources that enabled a generator to sell directly into wholesale power markets
and receive a ‘market premium’14 calculated as the difference between a measure of the average
monthly power price and the relevant tariff. In the 2012 iteration of the law a generator could switch
between the tariff and direct marketing on a monthly basis. However, the 2014 EEG introduced ‘com-
pulsory direct marketing’, which strictly limits the circumstances under which a generator qualifies for
the fixed tariff, effectively mandating the direct marketing option.
While the level of remuneration for EEG generators has long been calculated on the basis of energy
cost estimates, the compliance with the state-aid guidelines issued by the European Commission in
March 2014 (European Commission, 2014) means that member states must implement competitive
allocation of financial support by 2017. The relevant German authorities are in the process of develop-
ing a renewables auctions system.
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3.3. The Netherlands
The Netherlands currently has two operational offshore wind farms installed in 2006 and 2008 with a
combined capacity of 228 MW and a legislative act is currently in progress that aims to significantly
reform the country’s approach to offshore wind (RVO, 2015).
Spatial Planning in Dutch waters is directed by the National Water Plan (NWP) under the Water Man-
agement Act (Wet Beheer Rijkswaterstaatswerken, WBR). While in theory the WBR opens up the entire
EEZ of the Netherlands to the permitting of wind farms, the available sites were restricted to two areas
by the NWP (Government of the Netherlands, 2009). Land tenure and permission to build were com-
bined in a single consent, issued and coordinated by National Water Department for the North Sea
(Rijkswaterstaat Noordzee) with significant responsibility on the developer to pursue the appropriate
consultations and carry out surveys.
In September 2014 the Government of the Netherlands announced plans to reform their
approach to offshore wind in order to promote rapid expansion of offshore wind in the Dutch
North Sea (RVO, 2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment & Ministry of Economic
Affairs, 2014).
In 2015 legislation is expected to pass15 that significantly alters the approach to seabed tenure and
development rights. Tenure will be allocated on the basis of specified wind farm sites located in three
designated offshore wind areas. The sites tightly define the wind farm, including location, cable routes
and the results of social and environmental surveys sufficient to meet all legal requirements carried out
by the Government (RVO, 2015; Loyens & Loeff, 2015; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
& Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2014).
The Dutch TSO, TenneT, has been handed responsibility for building and operating an offshore wind
grid with three points of connection to which offshore wind farms can connect. It is not yet clear
whether the TSO will charge costs back to the connecting developers or pass them through trans-
mission tariffs (Loyens & Loeff, 2015).
Since 2008, the Netherlands has supported renewable energy via its Stimulering Duurzame Energie-
productie (SDE) programme, which included a specific offshore wind tariff allocated by a competitive
tender in 2009. Relaunched in 2011 as SDE+ , revenues from the policy are structured as a sliding
premium tariff in which a generator is provided a level of support per unit production calculated as
the difference between the target support level and a measure of the wholesale power price (Jansen,
Lensink, O¨zdemir, van Stralen, & van der Welle, 2011; RVO, 2014)
Following the reforms, licences will be revoked for offshore wind projects that were awarded seabed
tenure under a tender in 2009 and seabed tenure, licences to build, grid connection and financial settle-
ment will be awarded to the winner(s) of a competitive bidding process.
3.4. Denmark
Denmark has often been cited as a leader in the deployment of wind energy technology, both onshore
and offshore and at the end of 2014 had five offshore wind farms larger than 100 MW in operation
accounting for nearly 90% of the 1270 MW of offshore capacity in the country (EWEA, 2015).
The primary approach for Denmark’s offshore wind expansion is tenders to build large-scale, com-
mercial wind farms on pre-determined sites. Tenders have been central to the Danish approach to off-
shore wind since the first call in 2003 (Meyer, 2007; Munksgaard & Morthorst, 2008).
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Sites identified through Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) are offered as a package of seabed rights, elec-
tricity generation licensing and an offer of a TSO-build and funded grid connection. Applications for
are assessed on social and environmental factors before participating in a reverse auction to award
the concession to the project bidding the lowest production cost.
The development and deployment of offshore wind in Denmark is overseen by the Danish Energy
Agency (DEA). The DEA acts as a single point of contact for nearly all consenting, permitting and licen-
sing activity including the granting of seabed tenure in a so-called ‘one-stop-shop’ approach. As part of
the process of permitting a project, the DEA coordinates communication for necessary consultations
between the developer and the various private and stakeholders and governmental bodies (DEA,
2014, 2015a; Government of Denmark, 2008).
Although Danish Electricity Supply Act entitles prospective offshore wind developers to approach the
land-tenure and development rights through an ‘open door’ approach, the financial settlement available
to unsolicited offshore projects is the same as that which is available to new onshore projects and there-
fore unlikely to be adequate to enable commercial investment in megaproject scale offshore wind16.
The final price per unit of output is provided to the auction winner by the national TSO, Energi-
net.dk, in the form of a contract for difference for a fixed amount of output, an approach that has
been used since 2005 (IEA, 2015c; Kitzing et al., 2012). In all cases, the TSO provides and maintains
grid connections as well as taking responsibility for planning and investment in the grid more
generally.
3.5. Belgium
Belgium has been actively pursuing offshore wind since 2004 with three large-scale, commercial pro-
jects with a combined capacity of over 700 MW operating by the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2015).
In 200417, Belgium designated seven offshore wind zones, all of which have now been allocated to
developers (Brabant, Degraer, & Rumes, 2011; Loyens & Loeff, 2014). The Federal Public Service (FPS)
for Economy reviews prospective wind farm owners’ application for rights to occupy the seabed in the
Belgian EEZ and advises the Energy Minister, who will then make a decision.
In order to build and operate an offshore wind farm in Belgian waters an Environmental Licence is
required from the Minister responsible for the marine environment based on the advice of the Manage-
ment Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models (MUMM) under a process that was substantially sim-
plified in 2003 (MUMM, 2010).
All offshore wind project in Belgium to-date have been responsible for their own grid connection,
albeit with up to one-third18 of the capital cost borne by the TSO, Elia (CREG, 2014; Loyens & Loeff,
2014). In 2013 plans were announced to begin the so-called Belgian Offshore Grid (BOG), a TSO
funded initiative to provide ‘socket-at-sea’ connections to future offshore wind farms (CREG, 2014;
Elia, 2013, 2015). Completion of the project was originally expected to occur by 2018 and works to
strengthen the onshore grid began in spring 2015. Although managed by the TSO, the connection
costs are expected to be charged on to the wind-farm developers.
Regions of Belgium began implementing TGC policies in 2002 (Verbruggen, 2004) with the legal
basis for offshore wind projects to sell certificates at a guaranteed minimum price in place from 2003
(Loyens & Loeff, 2014; IEA, 2015b; 3E, 2013). The minimum price effectively structures the remunera-
tion as a fixed premium to a project’s wholesale revenues.
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For projects reaching financial close after May 1, 2014 the revenue structure has changed. The new
system calculates the minimum certificate price as the difference between an average of the wholesale
market price19 and the target minimum price (initially EUE138) set by Royal decree. In common with
all other EU members, Belgium can be expected to begin competitive allocation of offshore wind
support by 2017 as required by the European Commission’s state-aid guidelines of 2014.
4. Results and summary
4.1. Results
4.1.1. Seabed tenure
Open door approaches to seabed tenure were the starting point in most cases but almost all countries
have altered the way tenure is allocated. From four out of five offering tenure on an open door basis to
the same proportion offering defined-sites or zones. Only Germany continues to allocate offshore wind
seabed tenure on an open door basis (Table 3).
4.1.2. Development rights
All countries have implemented reforms to the development rights process. The reforms have all been
quite different in approach. While some seek to relieve the developer of the burden of public consul-
tation or costly studies, others are based on the one-stop-shop principle of limiting the number of
points of contact between a developer and public bodies. Nevertheless, all countries have implemented
changes that increase the degree of centralization in decision-making about offshore wind develop-
ment rights (Table 4).
4.1.3. Grid connection
Other than the UK, which has a unique third-party model, all countries have moved to – or are in the
process of moving to – a TSO model for connecting offshore wind farms to onshore transmission
systems. There is some diversity within the countries taking the TSO-led approach, with Denmark
and Germany recovering the connection cost through a levy on network users or consumers, while
Belgium and possibly the Netherlands intend to recover the cost directly from the wind farm(s) to
be connected. The UK model does not allow for generalized recovery of connection costs (Table 5).
Table 3 Summary of approaches to seabed tenure
Open door Zoned Tender Single site tender
UK 2000–2009 2009-
DE 1997-
DK 1991–2004 2004-
BE 2004-
NL 2001–2015 2015-
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4.1.4. Financial settlement
Some form of constrained allocation of support for offshore wind has been implemented in most of the
cases. Although Germany and Belgium have not formally begun implementation of a constrained allo-
cation system, the European Commission’s State Aid guidelines of 2014 suggest that such a system
should be in place by 2017. Since 2008, all of the member state cases have implemented some form
of sliding premium mechanism. The means by which the level of remuneration of offshore wind gen-
eration is set is in most cases some kind of competitive process, with Germany and Belgium likely to
follow suit by 2017(Tables 6–8).
Table 4 Summary of approaches to development rights21
Changes resulting in more centralized development rights process
UK Decision by minister since 2008
DE Decision by BSH since 1997
DK All major permitting work undertaken by DEA since 2004
BE EIA carried out by MUMM since 2003
NL All permits administered by MEA since 2015
Table 5 Summary of approaches to grid connection
Developer model Third-party model TSO model Cost recovery mechanism
UK 2000–2007 2007- OFTO charges wind farm
DE 2006- TSO levy
DK 2004- TSO levy
BE 2004- 2018 TSO charges wind farm
NL 2006- 2016 Unclear
Table 6 Summary of approaches to financial settlement allocation
Automatic Constrained
UK 2002–2015 2015
DE . . . 2017
DK 2003
BE . . . 2017
NL 2009
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4.2. Summary
There has been significant policy innovation leading in the governance models for offshore wind
development in all five cases chosen. There is also some degree of convergence across all four of the
elements of offshore wind governance (Table 9).
While not all cases have arrived on an identical model, a broadly ‘European’ model can be observed
based on:
Table 8 Summary of approaches to setting the level of the financial settlement
Administrative process Certificate market Competitive process
UK 2014–2015 2002–2014 2015-
DE 2000- 2017
DK 1993–2003 2003
BE 2002- 2017
NL 2009-
Table 7 Summary of approaches to financial settlement structure
Fixed Sliding premium Wholesale +
UK 2014- 2002–2014
DE 2000–2014 2014- 1991–2000
DK 1993–1999 2005- 1999–2005
BE 2002–2015 2015-
NL 2008-
Table 9 Summary of national approaches
Seabed
Tenure Development rights Grid connection Financial settlement
UK Zoned Centralized but onus on
developer
OFTO Constrained allocation of sliding premium revenue
support
DE Open door Centralized and streamlined TSO and levy
DK Single site Centralized TSO and levy
BE Zoned Centralized TSO charges wind
farm
NL Single site Centralized TSO
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(1). designated-site or zoned seabed tenure model
(2). targeted reform of how development rights are issued (generally in the form of more centralised
authority)
(3). TSO-led, -built or -funded grid connection
(4). constrained allocation of sliding premium revenue support
Notable deviations from this model are the UK’s unique third-party ownership model for connecting
offshore wind farms to the grid and Germany’s open door approach to seabed tenure.
5. Conclusion
The innovation in offshore wind governance described here is characterized by the participation of EU,
national and subnational actors. Questions are raised about why the five countries analysed appear to
be moving towards similar governance arrangements. There is evidence suggesting that policy diffu-
sion between member states – via the EU or directly between member states – is at least partly respon-
sible for the convergence. The similarity of member states’ policy making conditions appears to be less
important.
One might expect policy diffusion within the EU, the very existence of which is an attempt at
policy harmonization between countries (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000; Padgett, 2003; Radaelli,
2000) but the role of EU policy varies between the four aspects of governance. In some cases the
influence of the EU appears to be direct. The European Commission guidelines on State Aid
require that instruments such as ‘auctioning or competitive bidding process(es)’ are used as the
primary support system for renewables (European Commission, 2014, p.31). The guidelines
undoubtedly have significant implications for the future financial settlement for renewables
across Europe. But this explanation does nothing to account for the fact that countries such as
Denmark, the Netherlands and possibly the UK began implementing policies to reform the way
in which financial settlements for offshore wind were allocated and their level set more than a
decade before the EU’s guidelines were published. One could hypothesize that one or more of
these earlier innovators successfully ‘uploaded’ their policy preferences to the EU level, which
were subsequently ‘downloaded’ to the other member states (Padgett, 2003). More research could
discover the nature and extent of influence.
Another area of economic governance in which the EU plays a coordination role is the regulation of
electricity networks. There has been innovation in the way offshore wind farms are connected to the
onshore transmission system and in all five cases a ‘generator model’ connection has been abandoned
in favour of two alternative models, possibly due to the requirements of the EU’s third electricity lib-
eralization package (Green & Vasilakos, 2011). But while the EU’s attempts to encourage electricity lib-
eralization may play a role in defining national approaches to offshore grid connection generally
(European Commission, 2008), an interpretation of the unbundling requirements that negates the
generator model is not universally accepted20. Also, the cost and returns to scale for offshore wind
grid connections that can account for up to 20% of a project’s capital expense create a powerful func-
tional argument at the member state level for TSO models (European Commission, 2008; BVG, 2010)
with the UK’s third-party approach an interesting exception.
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The effect of EU policy on the granting of offshore wind development rights is less direct. The ‘maze’
(Wright, 2014) of organizations and laws that must be negotiated was, until recently, almost entirely
different in each of the five countries. Some relied on legislation aimed at the electricity sector and
others on nature conservation law, much of which derived from the EU’s Habitat’s and Birds Directives
(Fox, Desholm, Kahlert, & Christensen, 2006) – an example of an EU policy with a history of patchy
policy convergence (Beunen & Duineveld, 2010). Nevertheless, all five countries have looked to
greater centralization of decision-making authority and/or reducing the number of stakeholder
voices with access to the process.
The EU-supported move to auctions as the primary means of allocating and setting the level of remu-
neration for offshore wind is likely to have secondary effects including greater centralization of off-
shore wind governance. The timing and sequencing of the planning process has been shown to be
of greater importance for the smooth functioning of auction systems than for other financial policies
(Del Rı´o & Linares, 2014). The implication is that auction processes demand greater coordination
between seabed tenure, the development rights process, grid connection and financial settlement. A
reasonable expectation might be that greater coordination precipitates an increased role for central
government agencies to manage the interactions. While Denmark and the Netherlands have
implemented or announced a fully integrated auction system with all four elements managed
within a single process, the other countries have only recently implemented an auction system or
will do in the next two years.
There are clear examples of national offshore wind policy makers working to exchange policy ideas
directly. For example, through networking events explicitly designed for the European offshore wind
policy making community to meet and share experiences and know-how, led by the Government of
Denmark but without representation of the EU institutions (DEA, 2015b). As well as direct social inter-
action, peer-to-peer diffusion may also result in emulation of apparently successful policies
implemented elsewhere.
Similar economic, institutional or legal conditions do not appear to predict the closeness or other-
wise of two member states’ offshore wind governance particularly well. The UK, the most classically
liberal market economy (LME) in the group (Hall & Soskice, 2001), is not especially market-oriented
in its financial settlement, innovating to make a market solution (i.e. auctions of sliding tariffs)
central to its approach to offshore wind around the same time as Germany and well after
Denmark and the Netherlands, all of which better fit the description of coordinated market
economy (CME). The UK’s unique third-party approach to grid connection might, however, better
suit the expectation of an LME.
Innovation in offshore wind seabed tenure has tended to reduce the breadth of options open to
potential developers. The approaches appear to be largely independent of the legal and institutional
basis on which seabed tenure is let. For example, the UK, with its landlord approach for seabed
tenure, has developed a zoned-tenure model – as has Belgium, a federal state with no parallel insti-
tution to The Crown Estate. The influence of EU policy is also muted with very little apparent
impact. It may be the case that Belgium and Netherlands observed and emulated the success of the
UK and/or Denmark, which implemented zoned and single-site tenure some time ago.
Offshore wind energy has the potential to play a significant role in the decarbonization of the
European economy and help tackle climate change. Approaches to the governance of offshore
wind development in Europe are converging on a common model with the EU so far playing a
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number of roles alongside other processes. Universal implementation auctioning of offshore wind
financial settlements may place incentives on national policy-makers to further centralize decision-
making about offshore wind in order to enable effective auctions to take place. This centralization,
combined with the megaproject scale of offshore wind projects puts it at odds with much of the
discourse about the role of scale and decentralization in efforts to tackle climate change and the
transition to a low-carbon energy system (Wiersma & Devine-Wright, 2014). For this reason
alone the wider political and social dimensions of offshore wind are deserving of much greater
attention.
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Notes
1. Flyvbierg (2014) provides a useful definition of mega project as ‘large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost
US$1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are trans-
formational, and impact millions of people’.
2. Defined here as the policies and regulations that govern the interaction between offshore wind project devel-
opers and the various national, local and non-governmental bodies involved in establishing a large-scale, com-
mercial offshore wind farm.
3. Although ‘tenure’ might not strictly be issued more the 12 nautical miles from a nation’s sea coast, where
the bulk of offshore wind megaprojects are built, the rights to allow occupation of the seabed in the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ) reside with the nation’s government under the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1982).
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4. With potential inappropriate sites and areas excluded in a process of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)
5. Settlement defined here as the access to and structure of revenue from targeted policy intervention – including
any support mechanism.
6. The value of which is not a function of the wholesale electricity price (Couture & Gagnon, 2010).
7. (Electricity: The Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2004).
8. UK Energy Act (2004) Pt 2 Chapter 2.
9. UK Planning Act (2008) s15(3)(b).
10. With first connections in 2011.
11. (Ordinance on Offshore Installations Seaward of the Limit of the German Territorial Sea (Offshore Installations
Ordinance)).
12. The coastal regions of Germany are covered by two TSOs, TenneT (owned by the Dutch government) in the
North Sea and 50 hz (partly owned by the Belgian government) in the Baltic Sea.
13. Chapter 2. Germany. Act on granting priority to renewable energy sources (Renewable Energy Sources Act –
EEG). (2012).
14. Generators also receive a supplement to compensate for the cost and risk of direct power market participation.
15. Offshore wind act submitted to parliament October 16, 2014.
16. Although not inconceivable – a number of projects are in the early stages of progressing through the open-door
system.
17. Although the first concession was let in 2003 (Brabant et al., 2011).
18. Up to E25m
19. 90% of the price at the APX electricity exchange.
20. Sweden, for instance, maintains a ‘generator’ model for connecting offshore wind farms (SKM, 2012).
21. Expected or upcoming changes in italics.
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